We study how increasing contract length affects adverse selection in health insurance markets. While health risks are persistent, private health insurance contracts in the U.S. have short, one-year terms. Short-term, community-rated contracts allow patients to increase their coverage only after risks materialize, which leads to market unraveling. Longer contracts ameliorate adverse selection because both demand and supply exhibit horizon effects. Intuitively, longer horizon risk is less predictable, thus elevating demand for coverage and lowering equilibrium premiums. We estimate risk dynamics using data from 3.5 million U.S. health insurance claims and find that risk predictability falls significantly with horizon. Nesting these estimates in a simple equilibrium model of insurance markets, we find that a reform implementing two-year contracts would increase coverage by 6% from its initial level and yield average annual welfare gains of $100-$200 per person.
Introduction
While most U.S. health insurance contracts last one year, some illnesses last longer. The combination of predictable individual risk with frequent opportunity to adjust coverage may result in adverse selection. Mitigating selection is central to health insurance regulation. It often involves limiting individual choice, such as the enrollment mandate imposed by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). But with rising premiums on the one hand and enrollment in the marketplaces being concentrated almost exclusively in plans whose out-of-pocket exposure is high on the other hand, selection on both the extensive and intensive margins leaves many individuals with incomplete risk protection.
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This study examines how extending the length of health insurance contracts impacts adverse selection. The main contribution is to explore the benefits of increasing contract lengths as an instrument to limit market unraveling. Conceptually, longer contracts reduce selection because over longer horizons individual risk is less predictable. Lower predictability allows for better pooling of risk over time within individuals, as opposed to simply across individuals. This mechanism impacts both supply and demand, and it generally leads to greater coverage and improved welfare. We study these effects empirically, using administrative claims data on healthcare utilization. We estimate that risk predictability declines by 10%-15% per year due to mean-reversion in healthcare expenditures. Nesting these estimates in a simple model of insurance exchanges suggests that increasing contract length from one to two years would increase coverage and reduce average deadweight loss in equilibrium.
We first show how to analyze an increase in contract length using the framework of . We focus on competitive community-rated insurance markets (like the ACA marketplaces), in which individuals periodically choose between standardized coverage levels. Graphically, increasing contract length (e.g., by extending the time between open enrollment periods) induces a flattening of both cost and demand curves. Intuitively, because individual risk is mean-reverting, individual ability to predict future risk declines, making the risk pools more homogeneous. We show that supply response is unambiguous, while demand leans towards higher coverage if the mean type gets such coverage in the first place and towards lower coverage otherwise. In equilibrium, these combined effects generally lead to more coverage. Gains from improved coverage are partly offset by exposing those with low coverage to greater risk.
We then estimate the key parameter-risk predictability-over different horizons, and find that it declines over time in a significant and robust way. We use administrative data with detailed individual healthcare costs and utilization for two separate populations. Data from MarketScan Research Databases cover a working-age population with employer-sponsored insurance, and data from Medicare cover an elderly population with public insurance. We predict individual overall expenditure over different horizons using different sets of predictors. Risk predictability declines significantly within each year: we show that two-years-ahead risk is only 85% as predictable as one year ahead. Surprisingly, while predictability increases when more comprehensive predictors are used, its decline over time remains similar. This decline is also similar for the two different populations studied. This estimated decline in predictability reflects mean-reversion in risk. A complementary parameter-the persistence of health shocks-is shown, unsurprisingly, to be higher for the elderly population. Mean-reversion in risks suggests that longer contracts may limit the scope for adverse selection.
Finally, we provide some empirical evidence regarding the potential equilibrium effects of increasing contract length on coverage and welfare. Given the lack of naturally occurring variation in contract length in the U.S., we estimate the demand response by calibrating a simple model of regulated insurance exchanges in the line of Handel et al. (2015) . We predict that such change would increase coverage by 6% over its initial level, yielding a reduction of 5%-15% in deadweight loss by an average of $100-$200 per person, depending on the initial level of coverage. Welfare gains are relatively small as longer contracts are a mixed blessing: Those who upgrade to high-coverage plans enjoy welfare gains, but those who still remain with lower coverage, even when contracts are extended, suffer from longer exposure to risk without the ability to upgrade coverage.
Practically, our results highlight how the annual periodicity of insurance enrollment in the United States has the implicit cost of increasing the scope for adverse selection. Some scope for selection is inherent in community-rated markets with free choice of coverage generosity, which include not only the ACA exchanges, but also the employer-sponsored health insurance market. We show that varying the frequency with which coverage can be adjusted is a new instrument for reducing such selection, by allowing for better risk-pooling within individuals. It adds to the existing and proposed policy instruments, which include enrollment mandates, risk adjustment, and premium penalty for lapsed coverage. These instruments all address a trade-off fundamental to the current healthcare policy debate in the United States-between choice and adverse-selection. We show that this trade-off also involves temporal aspect of consumer choice, and that the consequences of such choice are related to temporal properties over only a slightly longer period than the current one is not substantially different.
of the underlying insured risk. Further understanding how consumers value the flexibility to adjust their coverage over time and their actual reaction to such flexibility are important questions for future research.
This study adds to the literature studying adverse selection in health insurance markets and potential policy responses. Previous works have suggested the presence of such selection (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998; Culter and Reber, 1998; Heiss et al., 2013) ; studied its welfare implications Hackmann et al., 2012) ; and considered policy responses, including: plan standardization (Rice et al., 1997; Ericson and Starc, 2016) , risk adjustment mechanisms (Ellis et al., 2000; Glazer and McGuire, 2000; McGuire et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2014; Bundorf et al., 2012; Geruso, 2013; Hackmann et al., 2015) , and participation mandates (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2016) . Bundorf et al. (2012) document preference heterogeneity, which implies that preserving some choice among plans is useful, and show that adverse selection might not be dealt with by setting optimal premiums alone. Their findings highlight why mitigating adverse selection through increased contract length could be helpful in preserving choice while mitigating selection.
However, only a few works consider the dynamics of risk in health insurance contracts, including Aron-Dine et al. (2012) , Handel et al. (2015), and Cabral (2016) . Few theoretical works exist on adverse selection dynamics in health insurance, in settings radically different from the current regulatory environment, such as Diamond (1992) , Cochrane (1995), and Luz (2015) . This paper, in contrast, studies an environment similar to the current private U.S. insurance marketplaces. Handel et al. (2016) is the closest to this paper. They also explore the dynamics of risk and consider the impact of changing contract length on equilibrium coverage and welfare. The key difference is that they focus on contracts with very long (lifetime) horizons and assume that these contracts can be risk-rated. On the other hand, we focus on a less radical, and perhaps more realistic reform of existing marketplaces by looking at two-year, community-rated contracts.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we study the impact of contract lengths on adverse selection in theory. In Section 2 we estimate a key determinant of this impact-the predictability of healthcare cost over different horizons. In Section 3 we nest these estimates in a parametric version of the model to study the counterfactual implications of longer contract length in equilibrium.
Mechanism: Contract Length and Adverse Selection
In this section, we present a simple framework that incorporates varying contract length into the standard model of insurance markets with adverse selection developed by and used by Hackmann et al. (2012); Handel et al. (2015) .
We define contract length as the time between two insurance plan choices. Concretely, a contract length reform can be implemented in two ways: either by regulating insurance products by extending their term, or by enforcing less frequent enrollment periods. For simplicity, we do not distinguish between these two implementations. Our focus is to consider contract length as a policy instrument and conduct a comparative statics exercise with respect to the regulatory environment. Concretely, we consider a reform whereby all contracts are sold for two years, instead of a one-year term.
3 We assume there is no co-existence of one-year and two-year contracts, nor are there hybrid contracts.
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We study selection among standardized plans of varying generosity that are communityrated, like in the ACA or the employer-sponsored insurance marketplaces.
5 The focus is on analyzing demand and supply response to contract length reform in order to study the effects of longer contracts on equilibrium coverage and welfare. The objective is to uncover a new potential benefit of extending contract length in community-rated markets. On the other hand, the potential issues associated with longer contracts, e.g. commitment, are well understood (see for instance Handel et al., 2016) . Nevertheless, we make the plausible assumption that one-year and two-year contracts are equally enforceable.
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The mechanism we described is fundamentally different from the well-known idea that lifetime contracts chosen behind the veil of ignorance would remove adverse selection. Instead, we study a realistic potential reform that preserves three fundamental features of the current ACA health exchanges: consumer choice over plans, insurer competition, and community rating.
Health Insurance with Different Contract Lengths
Consider an insurance marketplace in which individuals periodically choose between two health insurance benefit plans-High and Low-with coverage levels ι H > ι L .
7 Denote 3 The analysis extends to comparing short-and long-term contracts more generally. 4 Sustaining an equilibrium with both long-term and short-term contracts seems difficult in practice. For a theoretical example using a dynamic pricing scheme, see Luz (2015) .
5 We choose to focus on the intensive margin of selection within coverage levels, conditional on buying insurance. But a similar logic applies to the extensive margin of selection into buying insurance.
6 This is not to say that they are perfectly enforceable. Currently, individuals can change their coverage at any time during the year when any one of several qualifying life events occurs (such as marriage or change of employment). However, the incentives to abuse such exemptions are unlikely to be drastically different across one-year and two-year contracts. Handel et al. (2016) provides an in-depth discussion of long-term contracts with imperfect commitment. Given that enforcement frictions are particularly challenging to measure in our context, we leave the question of optimal contract length to future research.
7 The analysis can be extended to more general contracts. We assume that regulated contract features such as co-insurance rates do not change with contract length, leaving the interaction between these policy instruments for future research.
by p the extra premium for purchasing High. Individuals maximize utility and have an underlying type θ 0 ∈ R, which determines their propensity to choose High over Low. This underlying type may depend on both individual risk (i.e., healthcare utilization costs) and other characteristics. When utility satisfies the single crossing condition, the aggregate demand for insurance is characterized by the marginal type θ * (p) that is indifferent between the plans at price p, and is given by:
We assume supply is regulated: premiums are community rated, rejections are prohibited, and coverage levels are standardized. The marginal cost of providing higher coverage to type θ * is:
where C(θ * (p)) is the expected cost of type θ * during the contract term. To facilitate the comparison between one-year and two-year contracts, assume the premium difference p and costs are annualized. The difference in the average cost between the plans' risk pools is:
In a competitive equilibrium, the premium difference p reflects this difference in average cost, i.e., ∆AC(p) = p. Adverse selection arises as costlier types are more inclined to purchase higher coverage. In such case, the marginal cost curve is downward sloping; the equilibrium price is generally higher than the efficient price, obtained when ∆M C(p) = p. Namely, adverse selection leads to under provision of coverage.
Significantly, the key driver of the magnitude of adverse selection is the relevance of individual type for plan choice. Adverse selection is smaller when individuals with different risk types make similar plan choices.
This channel explains the effect of contract length reform on insurance demand and supply. In this setting, risk predictability will impact adverse selection. The less predictable risk is, the smaller the scope for selection, because the difference in expected risk C(θ 0 ) is smaller across different types θ 0 . Graphically, when risk is less predictable, MC is flatter. Moreover, risk predictability depends on contract length, because the time between plan choices determines the horizon over which predictions are to be made. Over longer horizons, individual type θ 0 is a less effective predictor of future risk. As a consequence of this decline in risk predictability, both MC and AC curves are flatter with longer contracts (Figure 1 ). Notes: Average and marginal cost with one-year contracts (solid) and two-year contracts (dashed). Because of mean reversion, over longer horizons, between-individuals differences are smaller and more within-individual pooling is possible. Therefore, the difference in average cost between risk pools with High and Low coverage, AC, is smaller for all quantities.
This pivoting of the MC curve reflects an essential property of risk-mean reversion. Intuitively, over longer horizons, the expected risk of different types are slightly more like that of the mean type and therefore slightly closer to each other. We document mean-reversion in health expenditures in detail in the next section. In what follows, we highlight the effects of contract length on supply, demand, coverage, and welfare by focusing on the comparison between one-and two-year contracts. These horizons match our empirical estimates of risk predictability in the next section.
Equilibrium Effects on Coverage
We consider the effect of contract length reform, comparing two regulatory environments: one with one-year contracts, one with two-year contracts. We use our previous analysis to represent this comparative static exercise on one graph and argue that longer contracts change both consumer demand for insurance and its pricing by insurers.
The first main observation is that on the supply side, an increase in contract length increases coverage. Intuitively, coverage increases through a flattening of the AC curve.
Because AC shifts uniformly towards zero, this result is very general (Figure 2 illustrates this point). As contract length increases, mean reversion in risk leads to a flattening of the marginal cost curve and to a decline in the difference between risk pools for all coverage levels. From the point of an insurer, individuals become more homogeneous. For any given risk pool choosing the High plan at price p, the average risk falls. The difference between high-and low-risk types is more moderate, and consequently the dependence of insurers' profits on the composition of the risk pool is reduced. Under very general conditions, this change in the average cost curve induces an increase in equilibrium coverage. Increasing contract length reduces average cost by pooling risk over time, within an individual. This contrast with existing contracts that only pool risk across individuals. Longer contracts exploit the dynamics of risk: because risk displays some degree of meanreversion, pooling risk over time reduces the sensitivity of insurers' profits to individual risk types.
Interestingly, the effect of contract length on demand can increase or decrease coverage. The intuition behind this result is illustrated in Figure 3 . In both cases, an increase in contract length flattens the demand curve. Significantly, this flattening occurs by pivoting around a point that has an important economic interpretation. The demand curve pivots counterclockwise around the valuation of the representative typeθ. 
Notes: Equilibrium with one-year contracts (solid) and two-year contracts (dashed). In case (a) the representative type purchases High coverage; the demand response augments the supply response and further increases equilibrium coverage. In case (b) the representative type does not purchase High coverage; the demand response dampens the supply response. In this example, coverage still increases in equilibrium, but less than in case (a).
Indeed, mean-reversion in health risk implies that types become effectively more homogeneous with longer contracts. The representative typeθ is defined as the type whose value of insurance is left unchanged by extending contract length. In a linear-uniform example, it would correspond to the average type E[θ], but in general it can sit at any point of the risk distribution. The next section shows how to estimate it from the micro-data on health expenditures.
This explains the ambiguous demand channel. Effectively, as types become more homogeneous, individual plan choices tend to mirror the plan choice of the representative type. In the left panel of Figure 3 , the representative type originally does not choose the High plan. Therefore, as the contract length increases, fewer individuals choose the High plan. On the other hand, the right panel presents the case in which the representative type initially chooses the High plan. In this case, increasing contract length increases the share of the population choosing the High plan. Figure 4 illustrates the welfare trade-off. For a given contract length, the welfare loss from adverse selection can be represented as a parallelogram. As contract length increases, there are two effects that go in opposite directions. On the one hand, more individuals choose the High plan, reducing the length of the welfare loss. On the other hand, the gap between the demand and the MC curve increases, increasing the height of the parallelogram. Intuitively, this second effect comes from the fact that individuals are exposed to more risk when contracts are longer. Indeed, they will face future interim shocks, which are unrelated to their current type θ 0 , but (partly) persist until their next opportunity to upgrade to the High-coverage plan.
The Effects of Contract Length on Welfare

Empirical Estimates of Risk Predictability
We estimate the predictability of risk at different horizons, the key parameters that determine equilibrium coverage change. We estimate these parameters using healthcare utilization and cost data from two different administrative data sources: MarketScan Research Databases and Medicare Cost and Utilization Databases. We find similar results across these different samples: when moving from a one-year to a two-years horizon, risk predictability diminishes significantly. Notes: Equilibria with one-year contracts (solid curves) and two-year contracts (dashed curves). The shaded area is the deadweight loss due to adverse selection. Extended contract length leads to better within-individual pooling, which reduces selection and the deadweight loss associated with it.
Data
We use administrative data on healthcare utilization and costs. Important for our purpose, these data track individuals over time and, sourced from payors, are comprehensive. Data of the same granularity are used by insurers for planning and pricing, and thus the internal validity of our estimates is presumably high. Using two distinct sources covering different populations and different periods also supports their external validity. The rest of this section describes these datasets.
The first data source is Truven Health Analytics MarketScan Research Databases. These data capture individual clinical utilization, expenditures, and enrollment across inpatient, outpatient, prescription drug, and carve-out services from approximately 45 large employers for [2002] [2003] [2004] . These data represent the medical expenditures of the working-age population, an age profile similar to that of the target population of the ACA marketplaces.
The second data source is Medicare, the federal health insurance program for people who are 65 or older.
10 The data contain claims from Fee-For-Service Medicare beneficiaries. We use the Research Identifiable Files of the Master Beneficiary File and Cost and Utilization databases. These longitudinal databases record, for a 5% sample of Medicare beneficiaries, all healthcare utilization and costs over the period of 2008-2012. For comparability with the population in the ACA marketplaces and the MarketScan sample, both of which cover working-age individuals, we restrict the sample to beneficiaries aged 65-70 when entering the sample.
11 Table A3 shows summary statistics for each of the samples. The difference in age profiles and utilization patterns work in our favor, as they help us gauge the robustness of our estimates of the decline in risk predictability. Figure 5 visualizes the key parameter that drives our results: mean reversion in risk (i.e., in healthcare costs). It is a binned scatter plot of annual log costs of our sample of 3.5 million MarketScan working-age enrollees. While risk is persistent-bins preserve their rank order year-over-year-it also exhibits substantial reversion to the mean. Our estimates of (4), presented below, show this reversion holds even when other predictors of risk beyond cost are included. Figure A1 shows the sample distribution of log cost c 1 . 
Empirical Model of Risk Predictability over Different Horizons
To compare the predictability of risk over different prediction horizons-one and two yearswe study a finite risk process of the following log-linear form:
where c is log individual cost (i.e., C t,i = e 1+c t,i for t = 0, 1, 2), and θ 0 , ε 1 and ε 2 are mutually independent, zero mean. We let individual type θ 0 be a function of both the baseline cost C 0 and other characteristics known at t = 0, which we denote by X 0 . The key parameters determining the effects that changing the contract length has in equilibrium are α 1 and α 2 . These parameters represent how predictive current risk type θ 0 is of future risks for next year and two years from now, respectively. We estimate the model parameters using patient-level data in two steps. As a first step, we estimate an OLS regression of the next year's expenditures on the current information set:
where X 0,i includes patient characteristics potentially predictive of future costs, such as cost, demographic information, and former utilization that are known initially. To study how predictability varies with time, we "normalize" α 1 = 1 by defining the type θ 0 as the demeaned forecast:θ
This is the empirical counterpart of the private risk type θ 0 introduced in the general model above.
13 For robustness, we tried different definitions of X 0,i , ranging from cost-only to detailed utilization, demographics, and the presence of any of multiple chronic conditions. Appendix Table A1 summarizes the different sets of predictors we considered. As a second step, we estimate α 2 , capturing the decline in predictability due to meanreversion, by regressing expenditures in two years' time on initial risk typeθ 0,i and the interim cost shockε 1,i :
12 The model can easily be generalized to an infinite horizon AR model, or even ARIMA. Empirically, we use a log-linear specification that well fits the large skewness in health spending.
13 For now, we assume risk is one dimensional, although this could be generalized (say, to distinguish between chronic and transitory conditions).
Because we normalizedα 1 = 1, we expectα 2 < 1, such that risk predictability falls with the horizon. We also expect 0 <β 1 < 1, such that interim cost shocks display some degree of persistence. Whenever a longer panel is available, the same method can be extended to estimate risk predictability at horizons longer than two years.
Note that this specification of risk does not explicitly account for moral hazard, i.e., that plan generosity directly affects spending. Moral hazard is less of a problem in Medicare, where coverage level is fixed. In the other context, this effect leads, if anything, to underestimating mean reversion. Indeed, moral hazard induces persistence (higher α 2 ) in this setting: after a high realization of first-year cost c 1 , one can switch to a more generous plan. Moral hazard thus pushes cost c 2 in the second year upwards, reducing mean-reversion. The fact that the estimated decline in risk predictability turns out to be similar in these two settings that differ in the potential scope for moral hazard, suggests that moral hazard has in fact little influence on our estimates. Table 1 presents estimates for the decline in risk predictability between one-year and twoyear horizons. Across all specifications and for both samples, the estimated coefficientα 2 is close to 0.85, and statistically significantly different from 1. That is, at a two-year horizon, risk predictability is only about 85% of that at a one-year horizon. The coefficient capturing the persistence of interim health shock,β 1 , is about 0.4 in the MarketScan data and 0.6 in the older Medicare sample, which is to be expected. It is surprising that while predictability increases when more comprehensive predictors are used, its decline over time remains similar across specifications and in different settings.
Results
Risk predictability declines over different horizons for the Medicare sample, where we have five data years, 2008-2012. 14 Table 2 shows estimates of the magnitude of the decline, normalizing one-year predictability to 1. Clearly, both the coefficients and the goodness of fit decrease over time. The constant decrease in predictability over time suggests the difference we focus on-between one-year and two-year horizons-further generalizes to longer periods. Notes: Prediction of model (1) with log annuitized healthcare expenditure as the risk measure, and different predictor sets, defined in Table A1 . 
Counterfactuals Under a Contract Length Reform
The previous section estimated how risk predictability declines with the horizon, suggesting that the mechanism we highlighted in Section 1 is empirically plausible. Namely, increasing contract length, by extending the horizon over which predictions are made, should reduce the scope for adverse selection. In this section, we nest these estimates within a parametric version of the general model from Section 1 to provide preliminary evidence of what the magnitude of the effects of extending contract length on coverage and welfare might be in equilibrium.
Using the empirical distribution of risk from the claims data described in Section 2, we derive both supply and demand for insurance. We calibrate risk aversion to fit different initial levels of coverage in equilibrium in the baseline year. We then use this model to calculate counterfactual levels of coverage and welfare under an alternative regime with two-year insurance contracts. These estimates should be interpreted keeping in mind the following three caveats: (i) the risk data we use come from a specific population with employer-sponsored health insurance coverage; (ii) there is no exogenous variation in contract length to estimate demand response directly; (iii) our modeling choices are purposely stark. Nevertheless, we hope that these estimates provide some insight regarding the merits of extending health insurance contract length.
Setup
We focus on comparing equilibrium outcomes between two cases: one-and twoyear contracts. In both cases, individuals can periodically adjust their coverage level. In one case, they can do so every year.
15 In the other case, coverage can be adjusted only every other year. For comparability with one-year premiums, two-year premiums are annualized. The key difference between one-year and two-year contracts is that with one-year contracts, individuals may adjust their second-year coverage levels based on their first-year risk realization, whereas with two-year contracts, they may not. We set the standardized menu of two plans, High and Low, to be actuarially equivalent to the Bronze and Gold plans in the ACA exchanges, by setting the coinsurance rates to be 40% and 10%, respectively (ι H = 0.9 and ι L = 0.6).
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Supply To quantify the supply-side effects of moving to two-year contracts, we estimate the marginal and average cost curves (namely, ∆M C and ∆AC described in Equations 2 and 3) for different contract lengths using the empirical risk process estimated from MarketScan Claims. The distribution F (θ 0 ) is estimated using its sample counterpart, the empirical CDF of the fitted valuesθ 0 from (6). We bin θ 0 into 100 bins (defined by its percentiles). For each value of θ 0 , we estimate the distribution of C t (θ 0 ), for t = 1, 2 using Bootstrap. Specifically, we draw with replacement 1,000 instances of ε 1 and ε 2 from the empirical distribution of the residuals from the estimation of (4a) and (4b) and use our estimates ofα andβ to calculate the risk realization in each instance. Using this method, we calculate the cost curves for two cases: one-year contracts and two-year contracts, taking into account the difference in expected risks over different horizons. Figure 6 shows our baseline estimates of the supply side of the market for the one-year case, and Figure 7 shows the change in ∆M C and ∆AC due to moving to two-year contracts-the empirical counterpart of Figure 1 . Demand In the absence of exogenous variation in contract length (all contracts in our data are annual), we derive demand by assuming that individuals face this same risk process de- Notes: The change in ∆M C and ∆AC between one-year and two-year contracts, estimated using the empirical distribution of total healthcare cost in MarketScan data.
scribed in (4a) and (4b) and maximize expected utility. That is, we assume that individuals of type θ 0 choose coverage b ∈ {L, H} to maximize expected utility
, where P and OOP are the plan premium and out-of-pocket spending for the cost C(θ 0 ). Our analysis uses a specific, mean-variance utility function:
. The mean-variance utility function specified here can be replaced by any other utility function that satisfies the single-crossing property.
17 We discount both cost and utility using a common discount factor δ = 0.98.
Equilibrium Our supply estimates are pinned down by claims data, but our demand estimates have one degree of freedom-risk aversion. We calibrate the risk aversion parameter λ to fit a range of initial levels of High coverage with one-year contracts. For each such initial level with one-year contracts, we compute the counterfactual equilibrium with twoyear contracts, holding risk aversion constant. This yields a set of equilibrium pairs, allowing us to compare one-and two-year contracts for different levels of risk aversion (or, equivalently, for different levels of coverage with one-year contracts).
Welfare We measure the increase in coverage by comparing the one-year and two-year share of individuals who in equilibrium purchase (i.e., prefer, given equilibrium prices) the High plan over the Low plan. We measure the increase in welfare by calculating the decrease in deadweight loss. We define the deadweight loss, in the spirit of , as the area between the demand curve and marginal cost curve. This area reflects unrealized beneficial trades by those buyers who value better insurance coverage more than its (private) marginal cost to them, but eventually give it up due to its high price.
Remarks
In principle, it might be more direct to estimate demand ny exploiting quasi-random variation in contract terms and choice. However, the relevant variation for this paper does not exist in the U.S.: all contracts have the same horizon of one year. Instead, calibrating a model of insurance choice has the benefit of requiring only data on risk, as estimated in the previous section. The downside is that one must make a parametric assumption about the utility function.
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One could use our same methods to study contracts longer than two years and even lifetime contracts (see Cochrane, 1995; Handel et al., 2016) . We choose to focus instead on an incremental difference in contract length for two reasons. First, very long contracts present other complicating factors, such as aggregate uncertainty and commitment, that limit the feasibility of implementing them in practice. Second, from an empirical perspective, there is a greater confidence in extrapolating from the current annual contracts to an equilibrium with only slightly longer ones.
Results
Our counterfactual analysis suggests that increasing the contract length from one to two periods would increase equilibrium coverage by 6% and reduce deadweight loss by about 10%. Figure 8 shows the empirical counterparts to the schematic figures from Section 1 obtained from one of our countrafactual simulations of the market. Panel (a) shows the market equilibrium with the baseline scenario of one-year contracts, with risk aversion calibrated to fit the national share of High coverage, 10%. Panel (b) shows the counterfactual equilibrium in this market when contracts are instead sold for two years. As the marginal cost of coverage exhibits mean-reversion, both supply (dashed) and demand (in gray) flatten to meet at a higher level of coverage. Panel (c) juxtaposes the two cases: one-and two-year contracts, on top of one another, showing the empirical counterpart of Figure 4 . The changes between the baseline and counterfactual scenarios are driven by both a change in supply (Figure 7 above) and in demand (Panel d).
19 We repeat this exercise for different shifts in demand, corresponding to different levels of risk aversion and, respectively, to different levels of coverage by the High plan. The range of coverage levels we study covers the support of the distribution of actual coverage in the ACA exchanges across the United States (see 18 See Aron-Dine et al. (2012) for a case in which agents' start of insurance coverage is staggered across the calendar year, introducing a de facto small variation in the contract length.
19 Note here that the willingness to buy High coverage for the most risky types is significantly greater than most estimates in the literature. Introducing liquidity constraints or out-of-pocket limits would reduce it by orders of magnitude without altering the main results (See Appendix). Moreover, our welfare measure captures the deadweight loss at the other end of the risk distribution, largely sidestepping this issue.Panel (d) shows the change in demand between equilibrium with one-and two-year contracts. We repeat this exercise for different levels of initial coverage, which we match using different levels of risk aversion.
Although demand by the sickest for High coverage is reduced due to the reversion of their expected costs towards the mean, the demand for High coverage of the marginal type increases, and therefore coverage overall increases. Intuitively, the important channel is that with a longer horizon, healthier people are more likely to seek greater coverage. Figure 9 summarizes the increase in coverage for different initial levels of coverage. Although the system is non-linear, the increase in coverage under the counterfactual, longer horizon is roughly linear in the initial, shorter-horizon level of coverage. That is, the coverage level is predicted to be 6% higher under two-year contracts. Table 3 (Columns 1-3) summarizes the increase in coverage for different initial levels of High coverage. With out-of-pocket limits, the average increase in coverage is somewhat stronger and averages 10% ( Figure A3 ). In line with our discussion in Section 1, the overall increase in coverage is a combination of demand and supply responses. For low levels of initial coverage, the overall increase in coverage due to an extended contract length comes mainly from the supply side, whereas for higher levels of initial coverage, it comes mainly from the demand size (Table A4) . We predict that increased coverage due to increased contract length will be associated with an overall reduction in deadweight loss (Figure 10 ). This welfare improvement, albeit modest, exists for a wide range of initial coverage levels.
20 Increasing the horizon is not favorable to everyone: the healthiest types-those that rationally still opt for lower coverage in equilibrium even with a longer horizon-suffer welfare loss, as they are then exposed to greater risk. Their losses counteract some of the gains of the marginal types who obtain High coverage only with a longer horizon, resulting in overall modest welfare gains. Overall, our results should be interpreted with this trade-off in mind. 21 While our risk estimates rely on a large sample of non-elderly Americans, it is plausible that different samples would yield negative results. However, our analysis provides tools to study it and can be replicated to obtain the magnitude of the welfare gains in other settings.
Conclusion
This paper shows how extending the horizon of health insurance contracts impacts adverse selection in these markets. The main contribution of this paper is to show the implications of the dynamics of health risk over time, as opposed to simply its cross-sectional distribution. We show that increasing the contract length is another policy instrument that can be used to reduce selection. Conceptually, we argue that private information is endogenous to contract length because individual risk is harder to predict at longer horizons. This decrease in risk predictability is strongly borne by the data. Simulating a model of ACA-like exchanges, we find the effect of extending contracts to two years would be to expand coverage by about 6%. We also find positive, albeit moderate, welfare gains, partly offset by the increased exposure of part of the population to greater risk. Notes: Counterfactuals increase in coverage due only to supply-side changes from moving to two-year contracts, for different levels of initial equilibrium coverage with one-year contracts. Coverage is the fraction of people buying High coverage. For calculating the net supply-side effect of extended contract horizon on coverage, demand was left unchanged at its one-year (baseline) levels. Column (4) shows the increase in coverage due to changes in supply relative to the overall increase due to changes in both supply and demand.
